Focus on the recent Trends in Terrorism.

The Figure 2.1 shows that there have been several distinct phases in terrorist activity since 2007. In 2007 and 2008, most terrorist activity was concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to the US and its allies’ interventions. This impacted Pakistan, leading to an escalation in terrorist activities from 2008 to 2013. The Arab Spring and the rise of Islamic State (IS) triggered a surge in terrorism across the Middle East from 2011 to 2013, particularly in Syria and Iraq, while the growth of Boko Haram led to terrorism increasing in Nigeria. At its peak in 2015, almost 11,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks in a single year. From 2016, deaths from terrorism began to decline. Iraq saw a marked reduction in terrorism starting in 2017, whereas Afghanistan experienced an increase in terrorism from 2016 to 2021, followed by a notable decline in 2022 after the Taliban's ascension to power. During the same period, the Sahel region saw a significant rise in terrorist incidents and deaths, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Somalia. Since 2009 both deaths and attacks have risen by roughly tenfold.

2022 marked the lowest global death toll from terrorism since 2007, but in 2023, deaths surged to levels comparable to those seen in 2017. This increase, the first since 2020, was primarily due to the October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, which resulted in over 1,200 fatalities and the capture of more than 200 soldiers and civilians.1 Deaths decreased by 13 per cent in 2024, primarily due to the surge in deaths caused by the Hamas attack in 2023. However, without this attack, deaths would have risen slightly in 2024 by half a per cent, reaching their highest level since 2017. The Sahel remains the epicentre of terrorism, despite a decline in deaths in 2024 and renewed violence in MENA. The region accounted for 51 per cent of total terrorism deaths globally in 2024, compared to 48 per cent in 2023 and just one per cent in 2007. Niger, Chad and Nigeria saw increases in deaths over the past year, with Niger and Chad recording rises of over 80 per cent. However, these increases were offset by declines of more than 20 per cent in Burkina Faso, Mali, Cameroon, and Senegal, leading to an overall four per cent decline in deaths across the Sahel in 2024. Despite this reduction, 2024 recorded the second-highest death toll in the Sahel since the inception of the Index.

Globally, deaths from terrorism have declined by almost a third since the peak of terrorism in 2015, with Iraq and Nigeria recording the largest decreases. Deaths in Nigeria peaked in 2014 at 2,101, before declining to 392 deaths in 2022, the lowest level since 2011. Deaths from terrorism in Nigeria increased in the two subsequent years, rising by 34 per cent in 2023 to 533 and 565 in 2024. The resurgence of violence in Nigeria continues to be driven by intensified conflict between ISWA and Boko Haram, with both groups responsible for almost 60 per cent of deaths in 2024 in the country. Deaths from terrorism in Iraq have fallen by 99 per cent since their peak in 2007. This is indicative of a broader trend in the MENA region, where terrorist activities have lessened, especially over the last eight years. Contributing factors include the de-escalation of the Syrian civil war, IS’ operational shift from MENA to the Sahel region, and enhanced counterterrorism cooperation at both national and international levels. While attacks and deaths have declined by more than half since 2007 in the MENA region, the late 2023 resurgence of violence in Israel and Palestine has had a ripple effect on conflict in the region. Israel responded to the October 2023 Hamas attack by invading southern Lebanon, due to Hezbollah’s support for Hamas. This resurgence in conflict coincided with the fall of the Assad regime, leaving Syria in a power vacuum. Experts warn that the regime’s collapse could lead to a resurgence of IS in Syria, prompting the US to launch strikes on IS strongholds immediately after Assad fled in December.

 While a resurgence in IS activity in Syria is anticipated, recent trends indicate that IS and its affiliates continue to shift their focus to sub-Saharan Africa and more specifically Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon. The Sahel has become increasingly more violent during this period, with deaths increasing 30 times between 2007 and 2024. Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali recorded the largest increases, 1,532, 896 and 602 more deaths respectively in 2024 than in 2007. Groups such as IS and JNIM continue to wage a violent campaign in the region, capitalising on political instability and organised crime. Figure 2.2 shows the shift of terrorism away from MENA and towards the Sahel and, more specifically, the tri-border region between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.


Terrorism has become more concentrated over the past few years, as shown in Figure 2.2. Despite total deaths from terrorism falling by 13 per cent, the number of countries that recorded at least one death from terrorism remained static, from 46 in 2023 to 45 in 2024. There are 65 countries with a GTI score of zero, meaning that they have not experienced a single incident of terrorism in the past five years. By contrast, in 2015 when terrorism was most widespread, there were only 57 countries with a GTI score of zero. Of the 163 countries in the GTI, only 25 have not recorded a single terrorist incident since 2007.

CONFLICT AND TERRORISM

Conflict has been the primary driver of terrorism since 2007. There were 153,234 terrorism deaths between 2007 and 2024, of which 98 per cent occurred in countries that were involved in a conflict at the time of the attacks. In 2024, the 20 countries most impacted by terrorism were all defined as being in conflict.3 Chile is ranked 21st on the GTI and is the only country in the 25 most impacted of the Index that was not classified as being in conflict in 2024.

Figure 2.4 illustrates the trend in deaths from terrorism by conflict type. In 2024, 98 per cent of terrorism deaths occurred in countries experiencing some level of conflict. The concentration of terrorism deaths in conflict zones has remained above 95 per cent since 2015. Terror attacks in countries in conflict also tend to be deadlier than those committed outside conflict zones, with attacks in conflict countries killing 2.2 people per attack in 2024 compared to 0.9 people per attack outside conflict zones.

Although deaths from terrorism in wars have declined since their peak in 2017, deaths in minor conflicts have risen, with almost 2,400 terrorism deaths in minor conflict situations recorded in 2024. Even with the decline since 2023, terrorism deaths in minor conflict situations remain high. While deaths in non-conflict countries are well below the peak of 2015, they have also risen in the last two years, with a 25 per cent increase in the last year alone. The increase was driven by non-conflict countries bordering the Sahel, with Togo reporting 42 deaths and Chad 40, their highest death tolls on record. Despite the increase, terrorism deaths in non-conflict countries remain below 200.

Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. Terrorism is also one of many tactics employed by insurgencies and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. For example, terrorist groups like IS and Boko Haram carry out conventional military attacks in the context of their respective conflicts, as well as undertaking extensive terrorist activity. 

TRENDS IN THE WEST

In the West, total deaths from terrorism peaked in 2016 when 194 people died, while attacks peaked a year later when 176 incidents were recorded. Most of these deaths were caused by Islamic jihadists. However, both religious and politically motivated terrorism have subsided significantly in the last five years in the West, as shown in Figure 2.5. Between 2017 and 2024, the total number of yearly attacks in the West fell by 70 per cent, from 176 to 52. Deaths also fell significantly, with total deaths over the same period falling from 146 to 15, a 90 per cent decrease Political Religious Nationalist/Religious Nationalist Single Interest Undetermined 0 50 100 150 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 TERRORIST ATTACKS Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations 0 50 100 150 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM Most terrorist attacks in the West since 2007 have either been politically motivated or had no clear ideological motivation, with 429 political attacks recorded over the last 18 years. However, religiously motivated attacks were more lethal, with 494 people killed in the West in religiously motivated attacks over the same period. All the religiously motivated deaths in this period were caused by jihadists groups or individuals with a jihadist ideology. Recent events have led to concerns about a resurgence in jihadist attacks in the West. The most recent incident occurring in early January 2025, when an individual who had pledged allegiance to IS drove a truck into a crowd in New Orleans, killing 15 people.4 It was an attack reminiscent of the wave of IS inspired terrorism seen in the West in the mid-2010s. There have also been fears that the war in Gaza would lead to an increase in terrorist activity in Europe. Security services in Europe foiled several planned terrorist attacks in December 2023. These attacks were linked to Hamas, with some reported to have been targeting Jewish institutions in Germany.5 While the predicted increase in terrorism owing to the conflict in Gaza did not eventuate, there has been a sharp increase in antisemitic violence and hate crimes across the West, with attacks on synagogues recorded in Europe, Australia, and the US. The FBI’s hate crime data shows a sharp increase in antisemitic incidents in the US, with total incidents increasing by over 270 per cent between September 2023 and November 2023. Concerns have also been raised about the possibility of a spike in politically motivated violence and political terrorism, given the levels of political polarisation and instability that have been seen over the past five years. In recent years, most terrorist attacks have been politically motivated. Figure 2.6 shows trends in the US Political Violence database,6 which shows incidents of political violence that have led to at least one fatality. The data ranges back to 1780. For almost 200 years, the predominant form of political violence in the US was violent rioting, followed by lynching. However, over the past 40 years, almost all incidents of fatal politically motivated violence in the US have been terrorist attacks. From 2020 to 2024, 75 per cent of fatal political violence incidents in the US were terrorist attacks, up from 48 per cent between 1975-1979.

Much of the debate around political terrorism in the West has centred around which political ideologies have been responsible for the most attacks or most deaths from terrorism. Figure 2.7 looks at incidents of terrorism and deaths from terrorism by far-left and far-right groups and individuals. It shows that far-left groups were responsible for more terrorist attacks, particularly between 2016 and 2022. The vast majority of far-left terrorism in the West occurred in Western European countries. However, far-right terrorism over the same period was more lethal, with 292 people being killed in far-right attacks from 2017 to 2024, with fatal attacks occurring in Europe, North America, and Asia-Pacific. It should be noted however that almost all of these attacks, across both ideologies, were carried out by individuals who were not affiliated with a particular terrorist group.

The rise in undetermined or unaffiliated terrorism has been a consistent feature of terrorist attacks in the West over the past two decades, as shown in Figure 2.8. In 2007, 44 per cent of attacks could be attributed to a specific group or organisation. However, this figure has not been higher than 26 per cent in the last decade, and in the last year under eight per cent of attacks could be attributed to a specific group.

Between 2014 and 2023 there was a sharp rise in terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who were affiliated with a specific ideology, but not operating as part of a specific group. These ideologically aligned attacks rose from 20 per cent of attacks in the West in 2014, to a high of 76 per cent of attacks in 2020. Almost all of these attacks were individuals with a broad jihadist, far-left, or far-right motiv

However, in the past few years there has been a noticeable rise in the percentage of attacks that cannot be attributed to any group at all. In 2024, 65 per cent of attacks could not be tied to either a specific group or a specific ideology. While part of this increase can simply be attributed to a lack of information about certain attacks, it may also reflect the rise of ideologically confused or unclear attacks, reflecting the broader political and social uncertainty. Lone-actor terrorists often construct their own ideologies by piecing together elements from various, and sometimes contradictory, belief systems. This blending of ideologies isn't about strict allegiance to a single group or cause but rather reflects an attempt to justify violent actions. This approach complicates counterterrorism efforts, as it makes these actors unpredictable and harder to profile.