Focus on the Sahel.
The Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa continues to suffer from
the effects of increased political instability, amplified
geopolitical tensions, and the use of hard counterterrorism
measures to deter and destroy the threat from Salafi-jihadi
groups. While sub-Saharan Africa recorded a five per cent
decline in terrorism deaths in 2024 to 909 from the prior year,
the Sahel has seen the steepest increases in terrorism deaths
globally, with nearly 20,000 deaths since 2019 and 3,885 deaths
in 2024.
The Sahel region faces many converging and complex social,
economic, political and security challenges. These are likely to
continue to undermine the development of the conditions
necessary for stability, trapping the Sahel in a cycle of violence
and vulnerability.
The region has seen large changes in its conflict dynamics with
an array of armed state and non-state actors waging war,
controlling large swathes of territory and using resource
extraction and illicit economies to advance their strategic goals.
The groups include national armies, state aligned paramilitaries
and self-defence groups, separatist rebels, Salafist jihadist
groups. Added to this, there have been multiple foreign
interventions - from France, the United Nations, the US and
more recently Russia, through state aligned private military
companies, initially the Wagner Group and from 2024 onwards
known as Africa Corps.
The conflict is driven by deep divisions within societies and
conflicts between ethnic groups, between the central
government and peripheral regions, and global geopolitics.
While ideologies play a part, economics and power are more
important drivers of conflict, and in both cases the continuation
of conflict can be lucrative for the interested parties, and as such
propels the conflict along with little hope of a sustainable
resolution in the near future.
The inability of several Sahelian governments to provide
effective security has resulted in terrorist groups controlling
significant amounts of rural territory and making the Sahel
increasingly violent. Salafi-jihadis and bandits have looked to
exploit socio-economic, political vacuums as well as grievances.
Terrorist groups IS and JNIM continuing to gain momentum
with their violent campaigns in the region, with the Sahel
accounting 51 per cent of terrorism deaths globally in 2024,
compared with just one per cent in 2007. As Figure 3.1 shows,
the Sahel is increasingly representing more terrorism deaths
than any other region globally
Terrorism in the Sahel
Terrorism usually occurs as a tactic within a conflict setting,
used by groups with asymmetric power capabilities looking to
bring about political change. The current crisis in the Sahel has
been driven by several factors, including ecological degradation,
poor governance, ethnic polarisation, state security abuses,
pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam
ideology, disputes over natural resource extraction such as gold,
and the involvement of external actors such as France and
Russia.
The February Revolution in Libya, which led to the overthrow
of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011, precipitated a chain of
events throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qaddafi’s violent
removal, after 42 years, empowered the Malian Tuareg
separatist movement. Ethnic Tuareg soldiers who had been part
of the Libyan army returned to Mali. Salafi-jihadis joined them
to play an important role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali,
which eventually led this group to capture Timbuktu, Gao and
Kidal. The Salafi-jihadis were ultimately defeated, and the
Tuareg-Salafi Islamic Emirate of Azawad split and lasted about
one year.1
Failure by the Malian government and the international
community to properly resolve the conflict in Northern Mali, by
addressing its root causes, only increased tensions. It gave rise
to political, social and economic problems that spread from the
north, causing intercommunal violence in the Mopti and Ségou
regions between Dogon and Fulani. This also exacerbated
instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger
increasing intercommunal violence and jihadi activity.
Transnational Salafi Jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda and
Islamic State, established local affiliates in the region by
leveraging existing ethnic tensions and resource conflicts. These
groups have used their ideology as a tool to mobilise support,
overlaying it onto pre-existing divisions and disputes.
Figure 3.2 shows a significant increase in deaths from conflict
across the Sahel from 2011 onwards. This is likely driven by the
onset and increasing severity of conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Chad,
Niger, Cameroon and Burkina Faso. In 2024, conflict deaths in
the Sahel exceeded 25,000 for the first time
Groups such as Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina
initially focused on local issues, framing their actions through
an ethnic-nationalist-religious lens. However, these groups are
no longer active, having been absorbed into transnational
jihadist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed
when Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Macina Liberation Front
merged with the al Qaeda Saharan branch, al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2017. No deaths have been
attributed to al-Qaeda since 2017.
With its challenging terrain, distinct local practices and porous
borders, local leaders in the Sahel have tremendous autonomy.
They operate as political entrepreneurs, making calculated
decisions as to where to operate, how and against whom. They
exhibit greater willingness to negotiate or shift allegiances.2
The
implications for the security environment are substantial, as the
head of a terrorist group may not be theologically wedded to the
transnational jihadi networks. This varied operating context
raises the prospect of a larger shift in jihadi strategic thinking.
Historically, jihadis’ commitment to ideological purity weakened
their ability to build and hold a state, but this pragmatic shift
raises the prospect of sustained, low-intensity conflict that may
facilitate a future takeover.3
Weak governance is at the core of the persistent inability by
successive Malian governments to resolve differences amicably;
and gave rise to the emergence of the Dogon, Fulani and
Bambara militia. Communities were compelled to arm
themselves to ensure their safety, as the government could not
protect them. Similar developments occurred in Burkina Faso,
between the Mossi and the Fulani, leading to several clashes.
Increased intercommunal violence has led to further
recruitment by jihadi groups, particularly IS and JNIM.
Terrorism continues to affect the periphery regions of bordering
states like Togo and Benin, countries that had been previously unaffected; although the number of terrorism deaths were
relatively small when compared to neighbouring countries in
the Sahel.
This marks the further transnationalisation of terrorism across
the Sahel. Groups like IS and JNIM are also seeking safe havens
and new theatres of operations. Many of these new areas like
northern periphery areas of Togo and Benin are
demographically, economically and ecologically similar to
regions in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and elsewhere, from
which jihadi groups initially emerged over a decade ago. This
trend is not uniform however, other Sahelian states such as
Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia continue to experience
little-to-no terrorism.
Terrorist groups in the Central Sahel rely on a range of illicit
economic activities to sustain their operations. Rather than
directly engaging in organised crime, jihadist groups such as
JNIM typically make money by imposing taxes or providing
security and protection in exchange for payment.4
This model
not only generates revenue but also helps these groups integrate
into local communities, strengthening their influence. Cattle
rustling has become a lucrative illicit economy for terror groups
in the Sahel. The theft and trade of livestock have long been a
source of conflict in the region, particularly between seminomadic pastoralists and farming communities. Armed groups
profit by controlling cattle trade routes and imposing taxes on
herders, using these interactions to deepen their governance
structures. By offering protection in exchange for loyalty,
terrorist organisations exploit local ethnic tensions, further
entrenching their power in contested areas.5
Drug trafficking represents one of the most financially lucrative
illicit activities linked to terrorism in the Sahel. Although
terrorist groups do not usually control drug production or trade
directly, they provide protection to traffickers and levy taxes on
smuggling operations passing through their territories. Since
the 1990s, the Sahel has served as a major transit route for South American cocaine en route to Europe. The response to
drug trafficking has varied across the region, contributing to
differing levels of conflict. In Niger, Tuareg rebels returning
from Libya in 2011 were integrated into state-controlled
smuggling networks, maintaining relative stability. In contrast,
Mali’s government sought to dominate smuggling routes,
leading to conflicts with Tuareg groups and contributing to
prolonged instability.6
Groups in the Sahel have generated significant revenue from
kidnapping and ransom in the past two decades. Al Qaeda in
the Greater Sahara, the forerunner to JNIM, financed much of
its operations through kidnapping and ransoming foreign
nationals in Mali and Algeria. The activity is now at the core of
the economic operations of JNIM, with civilians who have some
role in business or politics across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
the most common targets. Kidnapping is also used strategically,
with individuals taken for political leverage and intelligence
gathering.7
JNIM has been known to escalate its kidnapping
activities when they seek to expand into new territory, then
reduces them once control is established. For example, in 2023
the number of kidnappings increased significantly in the
regions of Burkina Faso where JNIM was clashing with the
pro-government militia group, Volunteers for the Defence of the
Homeland (VDP). In 2024 there was a 94 per cent decline in
hostages in Burkina Faso falling from 144 to 8.
Geopolitics in the Sahel
The GTI 2025 examines the complex interaction between local,
regional, and global geopolitical dynamics and their impact on
both terrorism and efforts to counter it. The security crisis in
the Sahel, which began in Mali in 2012 and has since engulfed
neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, has been shaped by
domestic political agendas and their interplay with regional and
global geopolitics. Analyses of the Sahel region often present
overly simplistic narratives, focusing on the dominance of a
single great power, while overlooking the agency of domestic
actors and political dynamics, which are often more critical to
understanding the broader situation. The following section
explores how the interaction between domestic and
international politics has shaped the region's security crisis,
both historically and in its current state.
The domestic and international politics of the region in most of
the post-colonial period has been dominated by France, and a
close relationship between the rulers of the Sahelian states and
Paris. This has generally manifested in close security
cooperation and the domination of French interests in areas like
resource management.
Mali
In the security realm, Mali is critical for understanding this dynamic. Since 2012, several French- backed security operations have taken place in the Sahel. These include an EU Training Mission, French-led counterterrorism operations (such as Operation Serval, Operation Barkhane and the Takuba Initiative), and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Additionally, the G5 Sahel Initiative and other unilateral security operations, including the involvement of private entities, have been introduced to address insecurity in the region. However, none of these efforts have achieved significant success, and negative sentiment toward France has grown. The perceived failure of these missions to improve the overall security situation fostered the belief that France was more focused on protecting its own interests than serving the interests of Mali. Withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA The 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali significantly shifted the dynamics of the security relationship. Under Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali has pursued what it describes as a ‘sovereigntist’ approach to governance, seeking to rid Mali of foreign interests it believes exploit them. This approach has gained considerable support from segments of the population, particularly younger individuals frustrated by the inability of international actors to address the security crisis, and their perceived exploitation of the region's resources. This is partly due to the model of French interventions, which prioritised direct involvement with professional soldiers over providing training, tackling corruption in the military or enhancing the capabilities of local forces. The significant increase in negative sentiment can be seen in Figure 3.4, which shows a sharp increase in the proportion of media articles in Mali expressing negative views about France following the first coup in 2020. IEP has produced the following analysis using machine learning, with source data supplied by ICEWS to show the changing sentiment between Mali and France. ICEWS was discontinued in 2023, a similar dataset POLECAT shows similar trends continuing in 2024
The 2022 withdrawal of French forces under Operation
Barkhane significantly impacted regional security. The
responsibility for providing security transitioned from French to
Malian Armed Forces, supported by pro-government militias
and the Russian Wagner Group, now Africa Corps. Although
Barkhane's overall effectiveness in securing Mali was limited, it
did manage to maintain control around key urban centres, in
collaboration with UN MINUSMA peacekeepers. Many of these
areas are now under siege from JNIM and IS-Sahel.
In June 2023, the UN Security Council terminated MINUSMA's
mission in Mali after the Malian government withdrew its
support. Established in 2013, MINUSMA struggled with security
provision outside its base areas, burdened by a massive
operational area and infrastructural challenges. The phased
withdrawal of peacekeepers, completed in December 2023,
directly escalated violent conflict in areas previously under UN
control.
Figure 3.5 shows the location of MINUSMA bases, as well as all
conflict events in Mali since the withdrawal of UN forces. Fierce
battles for control of former UN bases emerged, involving
Malian forces, Africa Corps mercenaries, Tuareg rebels, and
JNIM. The violence in Kidal in November 2023 marked some of
the most severe active conflict between government and rebel
forces since the 2015 peace deal. The agreement fully collapsed
in January 2024, leading to escalating conflict in northern Mali.
Security threats persist, from jihadists who have become
entrenched across the country and a resurgent rebel conflict in
the north.8
In August 2023, the UN panel of experts on Mali
declared that IS-Sahel had doubled the amount of territory they
controlled in the country, while JNIM had continued to expand
operations. The collapse of the Algiers peace agreement and
the surge in violence, particularly in urban areas of central and
northern Mali, may create further opportunities for jihadist
groups to expand their influence and consolidate control in the
region. JNIM’s attack on the military academy and air force
base in Bamako in September 2024 showed a high level of
frailty within the military regime’s internal security.10 Although
large-scale attacks in urban areas have yet to materialise, a
security vacuum in densely populated urban centres could
further exacerbate the country's security crisis.
FIGURE 3.5
MINUSMA bases and conflict events, 2024
Conflict has intensified in areas around UN bases.
Russian involvement in the Sahel has significantly increased,
with the region becoming an important theatre for their
competition with the West. The Russian government, through
their private military contractor Africa Corps, formerly the
Wagner Group, deployed to Mali in December 2021 and operate
alongside Malian forces in counterterrorism operations. Russian
PMC troops are also potentially involved in operations against
jihadist groups in Burkina Faso. The record of Russia and Africa
Corp as security partners in the region is on a par with prior
missions.
The Wagner Group, now Africa Corps, has been less effective in
providing security and has been involved in mining and the
extractive industry. Africa Corps’ approach appears to be more
appealing to the military regime than UN or French models,
which focused on population-centred protection of civilians.
Reportedly, the brutal counterinsurgency approach employed by
Wagner, now Africa Corps, has brought significant approval
from Malian troops and parts of the population, who were
disillusioned by the failures of Western interventions. Following the failed uprising and the death of former Wagner
leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian PMCs have transitioned to
the Africa Corps brand. While their operations in the region
continue, they have been significantly impacted by Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Opinion polling of Malian
citizens in January 2024 was overall highly positive of both the
junta’s approach to security and relations with Russia, the latter
with 82 per cent approval. It is unclear whether this positive
sentiment has continued. In July 2024 at least 84 Russian troops
were killed after being ambushed by Tuareg rebels on the
Mali-Algeria border. Offensives in Northern Mali have largely
failed to improve the security situation and reports suggest
many Russian troops are becoming less willing to participate in
high-risk missions, and are increasingly withdrawing to the
areas around their bases. There are only around 1,000 Africa
corps troops believed to be actively deployed in Mali, down from
2,000 and substantially less than the combined 13,000 UN
peacekeepers and French troops that were deployed prior to the
withdrawal of both missions.
Gold Mining: A Mechanism of
Local and Global Influence
Terrorism and some of the broader intercommunal violence in
the region can also be linked to natural resource exploitation,
specifically gold. A rich vein of gold spanning much of the Sahel
was discovered in 2012 in Sudan. Two main forms of gold
mining exist in the region: large scale industrial mining,
generally the purview of multi-national companies; and state
entities and artisanal gold mining, local level operations that are
largely not regulated and are a source of revenues for local
governments, militias, terror groups, criminal organisations and
other non-state armed actors like private military companies.
Artisanal gold mining has rapidly expanded across the region in
the decade since, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Gold is central to the conflict dynamics in some of these areas,
which often lack significant state presence or control. The
revenue raised is potentially critical to funding group activities;
however, control of the territories where gold is mined and
transported is perhaps more crucial, as this territorial control
increases the scale of their operations and provides the financial
resources, security and power projection to influence the local
population. From 2018 onwards, attacks in Burkina Faso have
increasingly targeted artisanal gold mines and areas around the
mines.
Most of the time, terrorist groups in the Central Sahel don't
directly extract, trade, or smuggle gold themselves. Instead, they
control the areas where artisanal gold mining happens and
collect taxes from miners. These illegal economies have often
existed for a long time in places with weak governance. Both
state and non-state groups have benefited from, and even
coordinated, these activities.
Illegal activities need to be kept secret, so they depend on people
within the state to protect them. In countries with weak
governments, smuggling networks lead to competition among
those who can offer protection and make money from these
activities. This competition can cause violence as different
groups fight to control the territory, and the profits. This
struggle for control can then lead to instability in the state. Figure 1.5 shows the rates of terrorism deaths in the Sahel and
locations of established gold mines. Concentrations of terrorism
deaths in northern Burkina Faso correspond with the locations
of gold mines as JNIM, paramilitaries like the VDP and the
army of Burkina Faso fight for control over these areas. Many
artisanal gold mines are informal and not included in available
data. Russian operations in Mali reflect a broader pattern seen in
Sudan and the Central African Republic, where the acquisition
of resources such as gold and diamonds, along with the
acquisition of mining concessions, forms part of Russia’s
approach in Africa. This strategy involves providing security,
military assistance and other aid for access to valuable
resources, which, in part, helps Russia circumvent sanctions
imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The full extent of such operations is difficult to uncover. Wagner
troops were reported to have taken over artisanal mine sites in
the past and Russia has agreed deals to build a gold refinery in
Bamako.18 Mali’s largest international mining operations, run by
Barrick Gold, ceased operations in January 2025 when the
Malian government seized $245 million worth of gold, and have
blocked Barrick’s access to its mines, with the government
seeking to enforce recently passed laws mandating a larger
share of revenues from international miners. To date, however,
the full picture of Russian involvement in the mining sector in
Mali and beyond is piecemeal. While Russia may strike deals for
future concessions, at least publicly such deals are yet to be
announced. Given the sanctions imposed over Ukraine, it is
highly likely that the full extent of its operations will not be
known.
A less discussed but perhaps more significant part of this story
is the growing influence of China, which commands far less
attention but is, according to reports, more significant in the
mining sector. Chinese influence in the gold mining sector has
reportedly surged since the 2021 coup and in December a
Chinese owned lithium production plant opened, with the
Chinese ambassador in attendance alongside the junta leader
Colonel Assimi Goita, who described Chinese ties with Mali as “a
strategic and sincere partnership.” The development of lithium
mining in Mali is potentially significant, as lithium is a
component of electric batteries and a critical mineral for the
green energy transition. The more subtle and quieter influencebuilding approach in Mali appears to mirror Chinese strategy
elsewhere on the African continent, where it has built significant
influence in 27 countries. Russian operations in Mali have influenced and are being
influenced by its involvement in conflicts elsewhere. While the
invasion of Ukraine has incentivised Russian involvement in the
Sahel to procure sanction-proof revenue, it has also drawn
Ukraine into the conflict. Cooperation on intelligence sharing
between Tuareg rebels and Ukraine was confirmed by its
intelligence chief following the deadly attack on Africa Corp
troops in July. It has also been reported, though denied by Kyiv,
that Ukraine has supplied drones to the rebels, in what is
potentially developing as a proxy war emanating from the war
in Ukraine. Events elsewhere are also likely to affect Russian operations.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has placed Russian
military assets on the Syrian coast under threat. Russian bases
in Syria had been the staging point for operations into Africa.
While such operations could continue from Russian bases in
Syria, the lack of certainty on the new Syrian government’s
position remains an open question and complicates Russian
operations in Africa. The partial withdrawal and uncertainty
over the future of operations can be seen in Russia sending over
100 military vehicles to Mali, in January 2025, believed to have
been moved from bases in Syria. The potential loss, or
lessening of, influence in Syria may also push Russia to double
down on its influence operations in Africa. Russia continues to
build a base in Bamako around the military airbase that was
attacked by JNIM in September 2024. Africa Corps have maintained their presence in Libya, which
could become strategically more critical to its operations if they
lose their only current Mediterranean base in Tartous, Syria. In
addition to military assistance, Russia has also agreed a deal
with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to provide telecoms and
satellites for the three Sahelian states.
Gold is ideal for illicit smuggling, as it is difficult to trace and
highly valuable. From mines in Mali and Burkina Faso, gold can
be smuggled into Togo before being exported. With its value
potentially in the billions, even a small amount of gold could be
highly lucrative to jihadi groups. The junta in Burkina Faso
announced the closure of artisanal gold sites in July 2022,
partly to restrict jihadist groups’ access to funds. It is unclear
what effect this may have on access to gold mining. Similar
attempts in the past have been counterproductive, as jihadist
groups have used closures to gain popular support from local
communities that depend on the mines. It is also highly likely
that most of these mines continue to operate in areas where the
state no longer has control over territory. The government in
Burkina Faso has control over between 50 and 60 per cent of
territory in the country, meaning that much of the gold rich
region in the north of the country is outside the regime’s
control.
Russian operations in Mali reflect a broader pattern seen in
Sudan and the Central African Republic, where the acquisition
of resources such as gold and diamonds, along with the
acquisition of mining concessions, forms part of Russia’s
approach in Africa. This strategy involves providing security,
military assistance and other aid for access to valuable
resources, which, in part, helps Russia circumvent sanctions
imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The full extent of such operations is difficult to uncover. Wagner
troops were reported to have taken over artisanal mine sites in
the past and Russia has agreed deals to build a gold refinery in
Bamako.18 Mali’s largest international mining operations, run by
Barrick Gold, ceased operations in January 2025 when the
Malian government seized $245 million worth of gold, and have
blocked Barrick’s access to its mines, with the government
seeking to enforce recently passed laws mandating a larger
share of revenues from international miners.19 To date, however,
the full picture of Russian involvement in the mining sector in
Mali and beyond is piecemeal. While Russia may strike deals for
future concessions, at least publicly such deals are yet to be
announced. Given the sanctions imposed over Ukraine, it is
highly likely that the full extent of its operations will not be
known.
A less discussed but perhaps more significant part of this story
is the growing influence of China, which commands far less
attention but is, according to reports, more significant in the
mining sector. Chinese influence in the gold mining sector has
reportedly surged since the 2021 coup and in December a
Chinese owned lithium production plant opened, with the
Chinese ambassador in attendance alongside the junta leader
Colonel Assimi Goita, who described Chinese ties with Mali as “a
strategic and sincere partnership.”20 The development of lithium
mining in Mali is potentially significant, as lithium is a
component of electric batteries and a critical mineral for the
green energy transition. The more subtle and quieter influencebuilding approach in Mali appears to mirror Chinese strategy
elsewhere on the African continent, where it has built significant
influence in 27 countries. Russian operations in Mali have influenced and are being
influenced by its involvement in conflicts elsewhere. While the
invasion of Ukraine has incentivised Russian involvement in the
Sahel to procure sanction-proof revenue, it has also drawn
Ukraine into the conflict. Cooperation on intelligence sharing
between Tuareg rebels and Ukraine was confirmed by its
intelligence chief following the deadly attack on Africa Corp
troops in July. It has also been reported, though denied by Kyiv,
that Ukraine has supplied drones to the rebels, in what is
potentially developing as a proxy war emanating from the war
in Ukraine. Events elsewhere are also likely to affect Russian operations.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has placed Russian
military assets on the Syrian coast under threat. Russian bases
in Syria had been the staging point for operations into Africa.
While such operations could continue from Russian bases in
Syria, the lack of certainty on the new Syrian government’s
position remains an open question and complicates Russian
operations in Africa. The partial withdrawal and uncertainty
over the future of operations can be seen in Russia sending over
100 military vehicles to Mali, in January 2025, believed to have
been moved from bases in Syria. The potential loss, or
lessening of, influence in Syria may also push Russia to double
down on its influence operations in Africa. Russia continues to
build a base in Bamako around the military airbase that was
attacked by JNIM in September 2024. Africa Corps have maintained their presence in Libya, which
could become strategically more critical to its operations if they
lose their only current Mediterranean base in Tartous, Syria. In
addition to military assistance, Russia has also agreed a deal
with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to provide telecoms and
satellites for the three Sahelian states.
The overall influence in Mali remains highly competitive. While
Russia's growing influence, as indicated by FBIC data, has been
the most prominent, it is neither the sole nor the most
dominant actor. China, France, and the United States also
maintain significant influence in the country. What should not
be lost in these events is the ready participation and
engagement of Malian authorities. Russian partnership has
become symbolic of the rejection of unpopular Western
assistance missions, garnering significant popularity with
sections of the population.
Between 2019 and 2022, US influence in Mali also increased
paradoxically while European influence declined. This was due
to sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security
cooperation. Despite Mali’s political instability, the US remained
a key donor, with bilateral foreign assistance rising from $132
million in 2019 to over $156 million in 2020, reinforcing
economic ties and dependence. Politically, the US maintained
diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability
following the 2020 coup, ensuring continued engagement. Although security assistance was limited after the coup, the US
backed international efforts like MINUSMA prior to the
mission's withdrawal.
The use of private military actors, in particular, is believed by
the government to be crucial to maintaining sovereignty,
providing it with critical security assistance while avoiding
conditions or handing over decision making or sovereignty to
external actors. Though they are seeking to reclaim their
sovereignty, there is a risk they will simply swap one external
security dependency for another. Without improving relations
with regional neighbours and other parts of the international
community, it could become isolated and instead dependent on
outside patronage. The Malian model is, however, clearly being
followed by its two main neighbours, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Burkina Faso
In 2024, Burkina Faso remained the country most affected by
terrorism for the second year in a row. This year also marked
the third consecutive year with over 1,000 fatalities from
terrorism in the country. The northern and central eastern
regions, near the borders with Mali and Niger, experienced over
two-thirds of all attacks. Centre-Nord recorded the highest death
toll, including the deadliest attack of 2024, where JNIM
militants killed between 200 and 600 individuals in an assault
on soldiers and civilians digging defensive trenches.
JNIM remained the dominant terror group, responsible for
nearly half of Burkina Faso's attacks, with their activities and
fatalities rising by over 50 per cent. In contrast, IS operations
declined significantly, with only one attack in 2024 compared to
eight in 2023, and terrorism deaths attributed to IS dropped by
91 per cent, from 175 to 15. Despite these improvements, over
half of the attacks and a third of the deaths were attributed to
unknown jihadist groups, likely to be JNIM or IS Sahel.
Burkina Faso had substantially less direct intervention and
involvement by foreign powers prior to 2023, other than the
French troops who were stationed in the country since 2009.
Following the second coup in September 2022, Captain Ibrahim
Traore began strengthening ties with Russia around military
assistance and, in January 2023, called for a withdrawal of
French troops and its ambassador. In January 2024, Russian
private military troops began arriving in Ouagadougou, with the
peak troop presence around 300. There has been little
improvement in the security situation in the country, however.
In July 2024, at least 100 of the ‘Bear Brigade’ military advisors
left Burkina Faso to support Russian military responses to
Ukraine’s capture of the Kursk region.27 Given the severity of the
security crisis in Burkina Faso, the impact of Russian troops
remains uncertain. Reports suggest that their primary role has
been to provide direct protection for junta leaders rather than
actively engaging in combat missions.
Beyond direct military support Russian influence models have
been successful in advancing their geostrategic goals by shaping
narratives supportive of the military and countering western
and UN influence. Russian social media and traditional media
campaigns have been active for over a decade across Africa, with
attention focused in recent years on the Sahel. These efforts are
extensive, with two Russian-linked influencers collectively
reaching over 28 million social media followers. Their content is
amplified through a vast network of hundreds of Russianassociated accounts and pages, achieving significant reach.28
Burkina Faso has seen at least eight Russian-backed influence
campaigns, matching the activity recorded in Mali and the
Central African Republic, both of which host significant Russian
presence. Africa Corp has been the Kremlin’s central tool for
orchestrating influence efforts in Africa, linked to nearly half of
all Russian operations on the continent. Since the death of
Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023, Russia's disinformation activities
are transitioning to new entities, including the Russian Africa
Corps and the Africa Initiative News Agency.29
Russia has built its own media infrastructure with online, TV
and radio channels capable of controlling and articulating its
core narratives. Russian embassies have reportedly facilitated
the creation of African grassroots organisations to produce and
disseminate disinformation.30 Figure 3.9 shows the success of
Russia’s strategy to build influence in the region, beginning in
2017 and steadily increasing in scope. The start and increase of
Russian influence correlates significantly with the increase of
negative sentiment Burkina Faso towards France, seen in Figure
3.10.
US influence also increased during this period due to sustained
economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation.
Despite political instability, including the January 2022 coup
d'état, the US remained a key partner, providing significant
development assistance and supporting efforts to counter
extremism in the Sahel region. Politically, the US maintained
diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability
following the coup, ensuring continued engagement.31 Military
and other forms of assistance were frozen following the coup so
it is likely that US influence may be reduced in future.
The picture of influence, like that in Mali, remains complex. China has steadily increased its influence, having achieved its goal of Burkina Faso ending its cooperation with Taiwan in 2019. China has gained gold, copper and nickel exploration licenses and has also built strong relations with the new government. Whilst Chinese interests dominate along economic lines, there is a growing commitment to protect its interests against security threats. China has pledged 1 billion Yuan (US $136 million) in military assistance to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement members across Africa. This pledge, part of China’s Global Security Initiative includes support for an African standby force to carry out peacekeeping and counterinsurgency.32 Such a development is not unexpected where China seeks to protect its influence, especially in regions where non-state armed actors imperil its investments. The actual direct implications for security dynamics, especially in a country like Burkina Faso are unclear.
Niger
Terrorism in Niger escalated to record levels in 2024, following
the sharp rise in 2023. Attacks increased to 101, up from 62 in
2023, while deaths nearly doubled to 930. Civilian deaths
tripled, and military deaths rose to 499, making up over half of
all fatalities and marking the highest military death toll caused
by terrorism globally in 2024. The deadliest attack occurred in
the Tahoua region, near the Malian border, where over 300
gunmen killed 237 soldiers. No group has claimed responsibility,
though jihadists are active in the area. This was also the
deadliest global attack of 2024.
Tillaberi remained the most affected region, located in the
tri-border area with Burkina Faso and Mali. It accounted for 63
per cent of attacks and 67 per cent of fatalities in Niger, with
violence spilling into neighbouring regions like Tahoua, where
deaths increased fivefold. JNIM activity surged, with 13 attacks
causing 109 deaths, a fourteenfold rise in fatalities and the
group’s highest numbers in Niger to date. IS attacks remained
steady, though deaths attributed to them dropped by half to 108.
In July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup, with the
presidential guard overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum
and General Adourahmane Tchiani assuming power. The
justification centred around Bazoum's inability to counter
jihadist threats, although this reasoning was seen as a pretext,
especially considering the low terror attack frequency prior to
the coup. The coup led to a diplomatic crisis, with regional
powers threatening intervention and risking an interstate
conflict.
By the end of 2023, Niger distanced itself from Western allies,
ending security cooperation with the EU and began exploring
ties with Russia. The government ended military ties with both
France and the US. France withdrew its 1,500 troops in
December 2023.33 In May 2024, the US were told to withdraw
their troops from the country, including handing over their
$100 million dollar Airbase 101 in Niamey and Airbase 201 in
Agadez in northern Niger that had become AFRICOM’s main
base for counterterrorism and drone operations in the region.
The withdrawal was completed in September 2024, marking the
end of either US or French presence in any of the three states.
Niger
Terrorism in Niger escalated to record levels in 2024, following
the sharp rise in 2023. Attacks increased to 101, up from 62 in
2023, while deaths nearly doubled to 930. Civilian deaths
tripled, and military deaths rose to 499, making up over half of
all fatalities and marking the highest military death toll caused
by terrorism globally in 2024. The deadliest attack occurred in
the Tahoua region, near the Malian border, where over 300
gunmen killed 237 soldiers. No group has claimed responsibility,
though jihadists are active in the area. This was also the
deadliest global attack of 2024.
Tillaberi remained the most affected region, located in the
tri-border area with Burkina Faso and Mali. It accounted for 63
per cent of attacks and 67 per cent of fatalities in Niger, with
violence spilling into neighbouring regions like Tahoua, where
deaths increased fivefold. JNIM activity surged, with 13 attacks
causing 109 deaths, a fourteenfold rise in fatalities and the
group’s highest numbers in Niger to date. IS attacks remained
steady, though deaths attributed to them dropped by half to 108.
In July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup, with the
presidential guard overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum
and General Adourahmane Tchiani assuming power. The
justification centred around Bazoum's inability to counter
jihadist threats, although this reasoning was seen as a pretext,
especially considering the low terror attack frequency prior to
the coup. The coup led to a diplomatic crisis, with regional
powers threatening intervention and risking an interstate
conflict.
By the end of 2023, Niger distanced itself from Western allies,
ending security cooperation with the EU and began exploring
ties with Russia. The government ended military ties with both
France and the US. France withdrew its 1,500 troops in
December 2023.33 In May 2024, the US were told to withdraw
their troops from the country, including handing over their
$100 million dollar Airbase 101 in Niamey and Airbase 201 in
Agadez in northern Niger that had become AFRICOM’s main
base for counterterrorism and drone operations in the region.
The withdrawal was completed in September 2024, marking the
end of either US or French presence in any of the three states.
According to Gallup polling sentiment towards major powers
has shifted across the Sahel. Support for both Russia and the US
has increased in much of the region, as shown in Figure 3.13.
Positive sentiment towards Russia has risen by 33 per cent in
Burkina Faso since 2019, with smaller but notable increases
across the Sahel, except in Guinea, where it dropped by six per cent. Support for the US has also grown in many countries,
though it has declined in Burkina Faso and Mali by 9 per cent
and 15 per cent, respectively.9 The only country where support
for both has dropped is The Gambia, where support for Russia
has dropped by 16 per cent and support for the US has dropped
10 per cent
Positive sentiment towards
Russia has risen by 33 per
cent in Burkina Faso since
2019, with smaller but notable
increases across the Sahel,
except in Guinea, where it
dropped by six per cent.
Meanwhile, France is growing in unpopularity across many of
its former colonies in the Sahel, with 59 per cent of Malians
holding negative views about France. The most extreme changes
in negative sentiment can be seen in Mali and Burkina Faso,
when combined with the other former French colonies: Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, Senegal and Mauritania Figure 3.15
shows a clear increase in negative sentiment. Without Mali and
Burkina Faso, however, the levels of negative sentiment are
significantly lower. A new wave of anti-colonial populism has
surged in West Africa and has been utilised by military leaders
of the governments in both Mali and Burkina Faso. These
trends may persist beyond the Central Sahel states and are
certainly an area to watch into the future.
The geopolitical shifts and evolving dynamics in the Sahel have
created uncertainty regarding their impact on terrorism.
Counterterrorism cooperation between the Alliance of Sahelian
States and neighbouring countries is now shaped by divisions
between states aligned with Russia, the United States, or France.
In January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced a
5,000 strong joint military force to conduct counterterrorism
operations in the area where groups operate across borders.39
Given the extraterritorial nature of the counterterrorism
challenge, effective operations require collaboration and
cooperation beyond the Alliance of Sahelian States, to include
North Africa, other Sahel states, and Coastal West Africa. It is
also important for the US and EU countries to remain actively
involved. This is essential to disrupt the flow of illicit financing
and arms that sustain these organisations. Powerful regional
states like Nigeria will dominate efforts, and cooperation
between the alliance and other neighbours like Algeria and
Libya will likely also prove pivotal. While Russia and China are
ascendant in the region, the European Union and US are
unlikely to seek to abandon their interests. With rising conflict
within the region and growing external competition for
influence, the security outlook for the Central Sahel appears
increasingly bleak
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